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Abstract—We evaluate two decades of proposals to replace
text passwords for general-purpose user authentication on the
web using a broad set of twenty-five usability, deployability
and security benefits that an ideal scheme might provide.
The scope of proposals we survey is also extensive, including
password management software, federated login protocols,
graphical password schemes, cognitive authentication schemes,
one-time passwords, hardware tokens, phone-aided schemes
and biometrics. Our comprehensive approach leads to key
insights about the difficulty of replacing passwords. Not only
does no known scheme come close to providing all desired
benefits: none even retains the full set of benefits that legacy
passwords already provide. In particular, there is a wide range
from schemes offering minor security benefits beyond legacy
passwords, to those offering significant security benefits in
return for being more costly to deploy or more difficult to use.
We conclude that many academic proposals have failed to gain
traction because researchers rarely consider a sufficiently wide
range of real-world constraints. Beyond our analysis of current
schemes, our framework provides an evaluation methodology
and benchmark for future web authentication proposals.
Keywords-authentication; computer security; human com-
puter interaction; security and usability; deployability; eco-
nomics; software engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued domination of passwords over all other
methods of end-user authentication is a major embarrass-
ment to security researchers. As web technology moves
ahead by leaps and bounds in other areas, passwords stub-
bornly survive and reproduce with every new web site.
Extensive discussions of alternative authentication schemes
have produced no definitive answers.
Over forty years of research have demonstrated that
passwords are plagued by security problems [2] and openly
hated by users [3]. We believe that, to make progress, the
community must better systematize the knowledge that we
have regarding both passwords and their alternatives [4].
However, among other challenges, unbiased evaluation of
password replacement schemes is complicated by the diverse
∗An extended version of this paper is available as a University of
Cambridge technical report [1].
†Frank Stajano was the lead author who conceived the project and
assembled the team. All authors contributed equally thereafter.
interests of various communities. In our experience, security
experts focus more on security but less on usability and
practical issues related to deployment; biometrics experts
focus on analysis of false negatives and naturally-occurring
false positives rather than on attacks by an intelligent,
adaptive adversary; usability experts tend to be optimistic
about security; and originators of a scheme, whatever their
background, downplay or ignore benefits that their scheme
doesn’t attempt to provide, thus overlooking dimensions on
which it fares poorly. As proponents assert the superiority
of their schemes, their objective functions are often not ex-
plicitly stated and differ substantially from those of potential
adopters. Targeting different authentication problems using
different criteria, some address very specific environments
and narrow scenarios; others silently seek generic solutions
that fit all environments at once, assuming a single choice
is mandatory. As such, consensus is unlikely.
These and other factors have contributed to a long-
standing lack of progress on how best to evaluate and
compare authentication proposals intended for practical use.
In response, we propose a standard benchmark and frame-
work allowing schemes to be rated across a common, broad
spectrum of criteria chosen objectively for relevance in wide-
ranging scenarios, without hidden agenda.1 We suggest and
define 25 properties framed as a diverse set of benefits,
and a methodology for comparative evaluation, demonstrated
and tested by rating 35 password-replacement schemes on
the same criteria, as summarized in a carefully constructed
comparative table.
Both the rating criteria and their definitions were it-
eratively refined over the evaluation of these schemes.
Discussion of evaluation details for passwords and nine
representative alternatives is provided herein to demonstrate
the process, and to provide evidence that the list of benefits
suffices to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of a wide
universe of schemes. Though not cast in stone, we believe
that the list of benefits and their specific definitions provide
an excellent basis from which to work; the framework and
1The present authors contributed to the definition of the following
schemes: URRSA [5], MP-Auth [6], PCCP [7] and Pico [8]. We invite
readers to verify that we have rated them impartially.
In Proc. IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy 2012 (“Oakland 2012”).
evaluation process that we define are independent of them,
although our comparative results naturally are not. From our
analysis and comparative summary table, we look for clues
to help explain why passwords remain so dominant, despite
frequent claims of superior alternatives.
In the past decade our community has recognized a
tension between security and usability: it is generally easy
to provide more of one by offering less of the other. But
the situation is much more complex than simply a linear
trade-off: we seek to capture the multi-faceted, rather than
one-dimensional, nature of both usability and security in our
benefits. We further suggest that “deployability”, for lack of
a better word, is an important third dimension that deserves
consideration. We choose to examine all three explicitly,
complementing earlier comparative surveys (e.g., [9]–[11]).
Our usability-deployability-security (“UDS”) evaluation
framework and process may be referred to as semi-structured
evaluation of user authentication schemes. We take inspira-
tion from inspection methods for evaluating user interface
design, including feature inspections and Nielsen’s heuristic
analysis based on usability principles [12].
Each co-author acted as a domain expert, familiar with
both the rating framework and a subset of the schemes.
For each scheme rated, the evaluation process involved one
co-author studying the scheme and rating it on the defined
benefits; additional co-authors reviewing each rating score;
and iteratively refining the ratings as necessary through
discussion, as noted in Section V-D.
Our focus is user authentication on the web, specifically
from unsupervised end-user client devices (e.g., a personal
computer) to remote verifiers. Some schemes examined
involve mobile phones as auxiliary devices, but logging
in directly from such constrained devices, which involves
different usability challenges among other things, is not a
main focus. Our present work does not directly examine
schemes designed exclusively for machine-to-machine au-
thentication, e.g., cryptographic protocols or infrastructure
such as client public-key certificates. Many of the schemes
we examine, however, are the technologies proposed for the
human-to-machine component that may precede machine-to-
machine authentication. Our choice of web authentication
as target application also has significant implications for
specific schemes, as noted in our results.
II. BENEFITS
The benefits we consider encompass three categories:
usability, deployability and security, the latter including
privacy aspects. The benefits in our list have been refined to
a set we believe highlights important evaluation dimensions,
with an eye to limiting overlap between benefits.
Throughout the paper, for brevity and consistency, each
benefit is referred to with an italicized mnemonic title. This
title should not be interpreted too literally; refer instead to
our actual definitions below, which are informally worded to
aid use. Each scheme is rated as either offering or not offer-
ing the benefit; if a scheme almost offers the benefit, but not
quite, we indicate this with the Quasi- prefix. Section V-D
discusses pros and cons of finer-grained scoring.
Sometimes a particular benefit (e.g., Resilient-to-Theft)
just doesn’t apply to a particular scheme (e.g., there is
nothing physical to steal in a scheme where the user must
memorize a secret squiggle). To simplify analysis, instead of
introducing a “not applicable” value, we rate the scheme as
offering the benefit—in the sense that nothing can go wrong,
for that scheme, with respect to the corresponding problem.
When rating password-related schemes we assume that
implementers use best practice such as salting and hashing
(even though we know they often don’t [13]), because we
assess what the scheme’s design can potentially offer: a poor
implementation could otherwise kill any scheme. On the
other hand, we assume that ordinary users won’t necessarily
follow the often unreasonably inconvenient directives of
security engineers, such as never recycling passwords, or
using randomly-generated ones.
A. Usability benefits
U1 Memorywise-Effortless: Users of the scheme do
not have to remember any secrets at all. We grant
a Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless if users have to
remember one secret for everything (as opposed
to one per verifier).
U2 Scalable-for-Users: Using the scheme for hundreds
of accounts does not increase the burden on the
user. As the mnemonic suggests, we mean “scal-
able” only from the user’s perspective, looking at
the cognitive load, not from a system deployment
perspective, looking at allocation of technical re-
sources.
U3 Nothing-to-Carry: Users do not need to carry an
additional physical object (electronic device, me-
chanical key, piece of paper) to use the scheme.
Quasi-Nothing-to-Carry is awarded if the object
is one that they’d carry everywhere all the time
anyway, such as their mobile phone, but not if it’s
their computer (including tablets).
U4 Physically-Effortless: The authentication process
does not require physical (as opposed to cognitive)
user effort beyond, say, pressing a button. Schemes
that don’t offer this benefit include those that
require typing, scribbling or performing a set of
motions. We grant Quasi-Physically-Effortless if
the user’s effort is limited to speaking, on the basis
that even illiterate people find that natural to do.
U5 Easy-to-Learn: Users who don’t know the scheme
can figure it out and learn it without too much
trouble, and then easily recall how to use it.
U6 Efficient-to-Use: The time the user must spend for
each authentication is acceptably short. The time
required for setting up a new association with
a verifier, although possibly longer than that for
authentication, is also reasonable.
U7 Infrequent-Errors: The task that users must per-
form to log in usually succeeds when performed
by a legitimate and honest user. In other words,
the scheme isn’t so hard to use or unreliable that
genuine users are routinely rejected.2
U8 Easy-Recovery-from-Loss: A user can conveniently
regain the ability to authenticate if the token is lost
or the credentials forgotten. This combines usabil-
ity aspects such as: low latency before restored
ability; low user inconvenience in recovery (e.g.,
no requirement for physically standing in line);
and assurance that recovery will be possible, for
example via built-in backups or secondary recovery
schemes. If recovery requires some form of re-
enrollment, this benefit rates its convenience.
B. Deployability benefits
D1 Accessible: Users who can use passwords3 are not
prevented from using the scheme by disabilities or
other physical (not cognitive) conditions.
D2 Negligible-Cost-per-User: The total cost per user
of the scheme, adding up the costs at both the
prover’s end (any devices required) and the veri-
fier’s end (any share of the equipment and software
required), is negligible. The scheme is plausible for
startups with no per-user revenue.
D3 Server-Compatible: At the verifier’s end, the
scheme is compatible with text-based passwords.
Providers don’t have to change their existing au-
thentication setup to support the scheme.
D4 Browser-Compatible: Users don’t have to change
their client to support the scheme and can ex-
pect the scheme to work when using other ma-
chines with an up-to-date, standards-compliant web
browser and no additional software. In 2012, this
would mean an HTML5-compliant browser with
JavaScript enabled. Schemes fail to provide this
benefit if they require the installation of plugins
or any kind of software whose installation re-
quires administrative rights. Schemes offer Quasi-
2We could view this benefit as “low false reject rate”. In many cases the
scheme designer could make the false reject rate lower by making the false
accept rate higher. If this is taken to an extreme we count it as cheating,
and penalize it through a low score in some of the security-related benefits.
3Ideally a scheme would be usable by everyone, regardless of disabilities
like zero-vision (blindness) or low motor control. However, for any given
scheme, it is always possible to identify a disability or physical condition
that would exclude a category of people and then no scheme would be
granted this benefit. We therefore choose to award the benefit to schemes
that do at least as well as the incumbent that is de facto accepted today,
despite the fact that it too isn’t perfect. An alternative to this text password
baseline could be to base the metric on the ability to serve a defined
percentage of the population of potential users.
Browser-Compatible if they rely on non-standard
but very common plugins, e.g., Flash.
D5 Mature: The scheme has been implemented and
deployed on a large scale for actual authentication
purposes beyond research. Indicators to consider
for granting the full benefit may also include
whether the scheme has undergone user testing,
whether the standards community has published re-
lated documents, whether open-source projects im-
plementing the scheme exist, whether anyone other
than the implementers has adopted the scheme, the
amount of literature on the scheme and so forth.
D6 Non-Proprietary: Anyone can implement or use
the scheme for any purpose without having to pay
royalties to anyone else. The relevant techniques
are generally known, published openly and not
protected by patents or trade secrets.
C. Security benefits
S1 Resilient-to-Physical-Observation: An attacker
cannot impersonate a user after observing them
authenticate one or more times. We grant Quasi-
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation if the scheme
could be broken only by repeating the observation
more than, say, 10–20 times. Attacks include
shoulder surfing, filming the keyboard, recording
keystroke sounds, or thermal imaging of keypad.
S2 Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation: It is not pos-
sible for an acquaintance (or skilled investiga-
tor) to impersonate a specific user by exploiting
knowledge of personal details (birth date, names
of relatives etc.). Personal knowledge questions are
the canonical scheme that fails on this point.
S3 Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing: An attacker
whose rate of guessing is constrained by the
verifier cannot successfully guess the secrets of a
significant fraction of users. The verifier-imposed
constraint might be enforced by an online server,
a tamper-resistant chip or any other mechanism
capable of throttling repeated requests. To give a
quantitative example, we might grant this benefit
if an attacker constrained to, say, 10 guesses per
account per day, could compromise at most 1% of
accounts in a year. Lack of this benefit is meant
to penalize schemes in which it is frequent for
user-chosen secrets to be selected from a small
and well-known subset (low min-entropy [14]).
S4 Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing: An attacker
whose rate of guessing is constrained only by
available computing resources cannot successfully
guess the secrets of a significant fraction of users.
We might for example grant this benefit if an
attacker capable of attempting up to 240 or even
264 guesses per account could still only reach
fewer than 1% of accounts. Lack of this benefit
is meant to penalize schemes where the space
of credentials is not large enough to withstand
brute force search (including dictionary attacks,
rainbow tables and related brute force methods
smarter than raw exhaustive search, if credentials
are user-chosen secrets).
S5 Resilient-to-Internal-Observation: An attacker can-
not impersonate a user by intercepting the user’s
input from inside the user’s device (e.g., by key-
logging malware) or eavesdropping on the clear-
text communication between prover and verifier
(we assume that the attacker can also defeat
TLS if it is used, perhaps through the CA).
As with Resilient-to-Physical-Observation above,
we grant Quasi-Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
if the scheme could be broken only by intercept-
ing input or eavesdropping cleartext more than,
say, 10–20 times. This penalizes schemes that are
not replay-resistant, whether because they send
a static response or because their dynamic re-
sponse countermeasure can be cracked with a few
observations. This benefit assumes that general-
purpose devices like software-updatable personal
computers and mobile phones may contain mal-
ware, but that hardware devices dedicated exclu-
sively to the scheme can be made malware-free.
We grant Quasi-Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
to two-factor schemes where both factors must
be malware-infected for the attack to work. If
infecting only one factor breaks the scheme, we
don’t grant the benefit.
S6 Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers: Nothing
that a verifier could possibly leak can help an
attacker impersonate the user to another verifier.
This penalizes schemes where insider fraud at one
provider, or a successful attack on one back-end,
endangers the user’s accounts at other sites.
S7 Resilient-to-Phishing: An attacker who simulates
a valid verifier (including by DNS manipulation)
cannot collect credentials that can later be used
to impersonate the user to the actual verifier. This
penalizes schemes allowing phishers to get victims
to authenticate to lookalike sites and later use
the harvested credentials against the genuine sites.
It is not meant to penalize schemes vulnerable
to more sophisticated real-time man-in-the-middle
or relay attacks, in which the attackers have one
connection to the victim prover (pretending to be
the verifier) and simultaneously another connection
to the victim verifier (pretending to be the prover).
S8 Resilient-to-Theft: If the scheme uses a physical
object for authentication, the object cannot be used
for authentication by another person who gains
possession of it. We still grant Quasi-Resilient-to-
Theft if the protection is achieved with the modest
strength of a PIN, even if attempts are not rate-
controlled, because the attack doesn’t easily scale
to many victims.
S9 No-Trusted-Third-Party: The scheme does not rely
on a trusted third party (other than the prover
and the verifier) who could, upon being attacked
or otherwise becoming untrustworthy, compromise
the prover’s security or privacy.
S10 Requiring-Explicit-Consent: The authentication
process cannot be started without the explicit
consent of the user. This is both a security and
a privacy feature (a rogue wireless RFID-based
credit card reader embedded in a sofa might charge
a card without user knowledge or consent).
S11 Unlinkable: Colluding verifiers cannot determine,
from the authenticator alone, whether the same
user is authenticating to both. This is a privacy
feature. To rate this benefit we disregard linkability
introduced by other mechanisms (same user ID,
same IP address, etc).
We emphasize that it would be simple-minded to rank
competing schemes simply by counting how many benefits
each offers. Clearly some benefits deserve more weight than
others—but which ones? Scalable-for-Users, for example,
is a heavy-weight benefit if the goal is to adopt a single
scheme as a universal replacement; it is less important if one
is seeking a password alternative for only a single account.
Providing appropriate weights thus depends strongly on the
specific goal for which the schemes are being compared,
which is one of the reasons we don’t offer any.
Having said that, readers wanting to use weights might
use our framework as follows. First, examine and score each
individual scheme on each benefit; next, compare (groups
of) competing schemes to identify precisely which benefits
each offers over the other; finally, with weights that take into
account the relative importance of the benefits, determine an
overall ranking by rating scheme i as Si =
∑
jWj · bi,j .
Weights Wj are constants across all schemes in a particular
comparison exercise, and bi,j ∈ [0, 1] is the real-valued
benefit rating for scheme i on benefit j. For different
solution environments (scenarios k), the relative importance
of benefits will differ, with weights Wj replaced by W
(k)
j .
In this paper we choose a more qualitative approach:
we do not suggest any weights W (k)j and the bi,j ratings
we assign are not continuous but coarsely quantized. In
Section V-D we discuss why. In our experience, “the journey
(the rating exercise) is the reward”: the important technical
insights we gained about schemes by discussing whether our
ratings were fair and consistent were worth much more to
us than the actual scores produced. As a take-home message
for the value of this exercise, bringing a team of experts to
a shared understanding of the relevant technical issues is
much more valuable than ranking the schemes linearly or
reaching unanimous agreement over scoring.
III. EVALUATING LEGACY PASSWORDS
We expect that the reader is familiar with text passwords
and their shortcomings, so evaluating them is good exercise
for our framework. It’s also useful to have a baseline
standard to refer to. While we consider “legacy passwords”
as a single scheme, surveys of password deployment on the
web have found substantial variation in implemention. A
study of 150 sites in 2010 [13], for example, found a unique
set of design choices at nearly every site. Other studies
have focused on implementations of cookie semantics [15],
password composition policies [16], or use of TLS to protect
passwords [17]. Every study has found both considerable
inconsistency and frequent serious implementation errors in
practical deployments on the web.
We remind readers of our Section II assumption of best
practice by implementers—thus in our ratings we do not
hold against passwords the many weak implementations
that their widespread deployment includes, unless due to
inherent weaknesses; while on the other hand, our ratings
of passwords and other schemes do assume that poor user
behavior is an inherent aspect of fielded systems.
The difficulty of guessing passwords was studied over
three decades ago [2] with researchers able to guess over
75% of users’ passwords; follow-up studies over the years
have consistently compromised a substantial fraction of
accounts with dictionary attacks. A survey [3] of corporate
password users found them flustered by password require-
ments and coping by writing passwords down on post-it
notes. On the web, users are typically overwhelmed by the
number of passwords they have registered. One study [18]
found most users have many accounts for which they’ve
forgotten their passwords and even accounts they can’t re-
member registering. Another [19] used a browser extension
to observe thousands of users’ password habits, finding on
average 25 accounts and 6 unique passwords per user.
Thus, passwords, as a purely memory-based scheme,
clearly aren’t Memorywise-Effortless or Scalable-for-Users
as they must be remembered and chosen for each site.
While they are Nothing-to-Carry, they aren’t Physically-
Effortless as they must be typed. Usability is otherwise
good, as passwords are de facto Easy-to-Learn due to years
of user experience and Efficient-to-Use as most users type
only a few characters, though typos downgrade passwords
to Quasi-Infrequent-Errors. Passwords can be easily reset,
giving them Easy-Recovery-from-Loss.
Their highest scores are in deployability, where they
receive full credit for every benefit—in part because many
of our criteria are defined based on passwords. For example,
passwords are Accessible because we defined the benefit
with respect to them and accommodations already exist for
most groups due to the importance of passwords. Pass-
words are Negligible-Cost-per-User due to their simplicity,
and are Server-Compatible and Browser-Compatible due to
their incumbent status. Passwords are Mature and Non-
Proprietary, with turnkey packages implementing password
authentication for many popular web development platforms,
albeit not well-standardized despite their ubiquity.
Passwords score relatively poorly on security. They
aren’t Resilient-to-Physical-Observation because even if
typed quickly they can be automatically recovered from
high-quality video of the keyboard [20]. Perhaps gener-
ously, we rate passwords as Quasi-Resilient-to-Targeted-
Impersonation in the absence of user studies establishing
acquaintances’ ability to guess passwords, though many
users undermine this by keeping passwords written down in
plain sight [3]. Similarly, users’ well-established poor track
record in selection means passwords are neither Resilient-to-
Throttled-Guessing nor Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing.
As static tokens, passwords aren’t Resilient-to-Internal-
Observation. The fact that users reuse them across
sites means they also aren’t Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-
Verifiers, as even a properly salted and strengthened hash
function [21] can’t protect many passwords from dedicated
cracking software. (Up to 50% of websites don’t appear to
hash passwords at all [13].) Passwords aren’t Resilient-to-
Phishing as phishing remains an open problem in practice.
Finally, their simplicity facilitates several security bene-
fits. They are Resilient-to-Theft as they require no hardware.
There is No-Trusted-Third-Party; having to type makes them
Requiring-Explicit-Consent; and, assuming that sites add salt
independently, even weak passwords are Unlinkable.
IV. SAMPLE EVALUATION OF REPLACEMENT SCHEMES
We now use our criteria to evaluate a representative
sample of proposed password replacement schemes. Table I
visually summarizes these and others we explored. Due to
space constraints, we only explain in detail our ratings for at
most one representative scheme per category (e.g. federated
login schemes, graphical passwords, hardware tokens, etc.).
Evaluation details for all other schemes in the table are
provided in a companion technical report [1].
We introduce categories to highlight general trends, but
stress that any scheme must be rated individually. Contrary
to what the table layout suggests, schemes are not uniquely
partitioned by the categories; several schemes belong to mul-
tiple categories, and different groupings of the schemes are
possible with these same categories. For example, GrIDsure
is both cognitive and graphical; and, though several of the
schemes we examine use some form of underlying “one-
time-passwords”, we did not group them into a common
category and indeed have no formal category of that name.
We emphasize that, in selecting a particular scheme for
inclusion in the table or for discussion as a category rep-
resentative, we do not necessarily endorse it as better than
alternatives—merely that it is reasonably representative, or
illuminates in some way what the category can achieve.
A. Encrypted password managers: Mozilla Firefox
The Firefox web browser [22] automatically offers to
remember passwords entered into web pages, optionally
encrypting them with a master password. (Our rating as-
sumes that this option is used; use without the password
has different properties.) It then pre-fills the username and
password fields when the user revisits the same site. With its
Sync facility the passwords can be stored, encrypted, in the
cloud. After a once-per-machine authentication ritual, they
are updated automatically on all designated machines.
This scheme is Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless (because
of the master password) and Scalable-for-Users: it can
remember arbitrarily many passwords. Without Sync, the
solution would have required carrying a specific computer;
with Sync, the passwords can be accessed from any of
the user’s computers. However it’s not more than Quasi-
Nothing-to-Carry because a travelling user will have to
carry at least a smartphone: it would be quite insecure to
sync one’s passwords with a browser found in a cybercafé.
It is Quasi-Physically-Effortless, as no typing is required
during authentication except for the master password once
per session, and Easy-to-Learn. It is Efficient-to-Use (much
more so than what it replaces) and has Infrequent-Errors
(hardly any, except when entering the master password). It
does not have Easy-Recovery-from-Loss: losing the master
password is catastrophic.
The scheme is backwards-compatible by design and thus
scores quite highly on deployability: it fully provides all
the deployability benefits except for Browser-Compatible,
unavoidably because it requires a specific browser.
It is Quasi-Resilient-to-Physical-Observation and Quasi-
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation because an attacker
could still target the infrequently-typed master password
(but would also need access to the browser). It is not
Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing nor Resilient-to-Unthrottled-
Guessing: even if the master password is safe from such
attacks, the original web passwords remain as vulnerable as
before.4 It is not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation because,
even if TLS is used, it’s replayable static passwords that flow
in the tunnel and malware could also capture the master
password. It’s not Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers,
because what happens at the back-end is the same as with
passwords. It’s Resilient-to-Phishing because we assume
that sites follow best practice, which includes using TLS
for the login page. It is Resilient-to-Theft, at least under
4Security-conscious users might adopt truly random unguessable pass-
words, as they need no longer remember them, but most users won’t. If
the scheme pre-generated random passwords it would score more highly
here, disregarding pre-existing passwords. Similarly, for Resilient-to-Leaks-
from-Other-Verifiers below, this scheme makes it easier for careful users to
use a different password for every site; if it forced this behaviour (vs. just
allowing it), it would get a higher score on this particular benefit.
our assumption that a master password is being used. It
offers No-Trusted-Third-Party because the Sync data is pre-
encrypted locally before being stored on Mozilla’s servers.
It offers Requiring-Explicit-Consent because it pre-fills the
username and password fields but the user still has to press
enter to submit. Finally, it is as Unlinkable as passwords.
B. Proxy-based: URRSA
Proxy-based schemes place a man-in-the-middle between
the user’s machine and the server. One reason for doing so,
employed by Impostor [23] and URRSA [5] is to enable
secure logins despite malware-infected clients.
URRSA has users authenticate to the end server using
one-time codes carried on a sheet of paper. At registration
the user enters the password, Pj , for each account, j, to be
visited; this is encrypted at the proxy with thirty different
keys, Ki, giving Ci = EKi(Pj). The Ci act as one-time
codes which the user prints and carries. The codes are
generally 8-10 characters long; thirty codes for each of six
accounts fit on a two-sided sheet. The keys, but not the
passwords, are stored at the proxy. At login the user visits
the proxy, indicates which site is desired, and is asked for the
next unused code. When he enters the code it is decrypted
and passed to the end login server: E−1Ki (Ci) = Pj . The
proxy never authenticates the user, it merely decrypts with
an agreed-upon key, the code delivered by the user.
Since it requires carrying one-time codes URRSA
is Memorywise-Effortless, but not Scalable-for-Users or
Nothing-to-Carry. It is not Physically-Effortless but is Easy-
to-Learn. In common with all of the schemes that in-
volve transcribing codes from a device or sheet it is not
Efficient-to-Use. However, we do consider it to have Quasi-
Infrequent-Errors, since the codes are generally 8-10 charac-
ters. It does not have Easy-Recovery-from-Loss: a revocation
procedure is required if the code sheet is lost or stolen. Since
no passwords are stored at the proxy the entire registration
must be repeated if this happens.
In common with other paper token schemes it is not
Accessible. URRSA has Negligible-Cost-per-User. Rather
than have a user change browser settings, URRSA relies on a
link-translating proxy that intermediates traffic between the
user and the server; this translation is not flawless and some
functionality may fail on complex sites, thus we consider
it only Quasi-Server-Compatible. It is, however, Browser-
Compatible. It is neither Mature nor Non-Proprietary.
In common with other one-time code schemes it is
not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, since a camera might
capture all of the codes on the sheet. Since it merely inserts
a proxy it inherits many security weaknesses from the legacy
password system it serves: it is Quasi-Resilient-to-Targeted-
Impersonation and is not Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing or
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing. It is Quasi-Resilient-to-
Internal-Observation as observing the client during authenti-
cation does not allow passwords to be captured, but breaking
the proxy-to-server TLS connection does. It inherits from
passwords the fact that it is not Resilient-to-Leaks-from-
Other-Verifiers, but the fact that it is Resilient-to-Phishing
from other one-time schemes. It is not Resilient-to-Theft nor
No-Trusted-Third-Party: the proxy must be trusted. It offers
Requiring-Explicit-Consent and is Unlinkable.
C. Federated Single Sign-On: OpenID
Federated single sign-on enables web sites to authenticate
a user by redirecting them to a trusted identity server which
attests the users’ identity. This has been considered a “holy
grail” as it could eliminate the problem of remembering dif-
ferent passwords for different sites. The concept of federated
authentication dates at least to the 1978 Needham-Schroeder
key agreement protocol [24] which formed the basis for
Kerberos [25]. Kerberos has inspired dozens of proposals
for federated authentication on the Internet; Pashalidis and
Mitchell provided a complete survey [26]. A well-known
representative is OpenID,5 a protocol which allows any web
server to act as an “identity provider” [27] to any server
desiring authentication (a “relying party”). OpenID has an
enthusiastic group of followers both in and out of academia,
but it has seen only patchy adoption with many sites willing
to act as identity providers but few willing to accept it as
relying parties [28].
In evaluating OpenID, we note that in practice identity
providers will continue to use text passwords to authenticate
users in the forseeable future, although the protocol itself
allows passwords to be replaced by a stronger mechanism.
Thus, we rate the scheme Quasi-Memorywise-Effortless in
that most users will still have to remember one master
password, but Scalable-for-Users as this password can work
for multiple sites. OpenID is Nothing-to-Carry like pass-
words and Quasi-Physically-Effortless because passwords
only need to be typed at the identity provider. Similarly,
we rate it Efficient-to-Use and Infrequent-Errors in that
it is either a password authentication or can occur auto-
matically in a browser with cached login cookies for the
identity provider. However, OpenID has found that selecting
an opaque “identity URL” can be a significant usability
challenge without a good interface at the relying party,
making the scheme only Quasi-Easy-to-Learn. OpenID is
Easy-Recovery-from-Loss, equivalent to a password reset.
OpenID is favorable from a deployment standpoint, pro-
viding all benefits except for Server-Compatible, includ-
ing Mature as it has detailed standards and many open-
source implementations. We do note however that it requires
identity providers yield some control over trust decisions
and possibly weaken their own brand [28], a deployment
drawback not currently captured in our criteria.
5OpenID is often confused with OAuth, a technically unrelated protocol
for delegating access to one’s accounts to third parties. The recent OpenID
Connect proposal merges the two. We consider the OpenID 2.0 standard
here, though all current versions score identically in our framework.
Security-wise, OpenID reduces most attacks to only
the password authentication between a user and his or
her identity provider. This makes it somewhat difficult to
rate; we consider it Quasi-Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing,
Quasi-Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing, Quasi-Resilient-
to-Targeted-Impersonation, Quasi-Resilient-to-Physical-
Observation as these attacks are possible but only against
the single identity provider (typically cached in a cookie)
and not for each login to all verifiers. However, it is not
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation as malware can either
steal persistent login cookies or record the master password.
OpenID is also believed to be badly non-Resilient-to-
Phishing since it involves re-direction to an identity
provider from a relying party [29]. OpenID is Resilient-to-
Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, as relying parties don’t store
users passwords. Federated schemes have been criticized on
privacy grounds and, while OpenID does enable technically
savvy users to operate their own identity provider, we rate
OpenID as non-Unlinkable and non-No-Trusted-Third-Party
as the vast majority of users aren’t capable of doing so.
D. Graphical passwords: Persuasive Cued Clickpoints
(PCCP)
Graphical passwords schemes attempt to leverage natural
human ability to remember images, which is believed to
exceed memory for text. We consider as a representative
PCCP [7] (Persuasive Cued Click-Points), a cued-recall
scheme. Users are sequentially presented with five images
on each of which they select one point, determining the
next image displayed. To log in, all selected points must be
correctly re-entered within a defined tolerance. To flatten the
password distribution, during password creation a randomly-
positioned portal covers a portion of each image; users
must select their point from therein (the rest of each image
is shaded slightly). Users may hit a “shuffle" button to
randomly reposition the portal to a different region—but
doing so consumes time, thus persuading otherwise. The
portal is absent on regular login. Published security analysis
and testing report reasonable usability and improved security
over earlier schemes, specifically in terms of resistance to
both hotspots and pattern-based attacks [11].
While not Memorywise-Effortless, nor Scalable-for-Users
due to extra cognitive load for each account password, PCCP
offers advantages over text passwords (and other uncued
schemes) due to per-account image cues reducing password
interference. It is Easy-to-Learn (usage and mental models
match web passwords, but interface details differ), but only
Quasi-Efficient-to-Use (login times on the order of 5s to 20s
exceed text passwords) and at best Quasi-Infrequent-Errors.
PCCP is not Accessible (consider blind users) and
has Negligible-Cost-per-User. It is not Server-Compatible;
though it might be made so by having a proxy act as inter-
mediary (much as URRSA does). It is Browser-Compatible.
It is not Mature, but apparently Non-Proprietary.
PCCP is not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation (due to
video-camera shoulder surfing), but is Resilient-to-Targeted-
Impersonation (personal knowledge of a target user does
not help attacks). We rate it Quasi-Resilient-to-Throttled-
Guessing due to portal persuasion increasing password ran-
domness, but note individual users may repeatedly bypass
portal recommendations. Although the persuasion is also
intended to mitigate offline attacks, we rate it not Resilient-
to-Unthrottled-Guessing as studies to date have been limited
to full password spaces of 243 (which are within reach of
offline dictionary attack, especially for users choosing more
predictable passwords, assuming verifier-stored hashes are
available). It is not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation (static
passwords are replayable). It is Resilient-to-Leaks-from-
Other-Verifiers (distinct sites can insist on distinct image
sets). PCCP is Resilient-to-Phishing per our strict definition
of that benefit; to obtain the proper per-user images, a
phishing site must interact (e.g., by MITM) with a legitimate
server. PCCP matches text passwords on being Unlinkable.
E. Cognitive authentication: GrIDsure
Challenge-Response schemes attempt to address the re-
play attack on passwords by having the user deliver proof
that he knows the secret without divulging the secret itself.
If memorization and computation were no barrier then the
server might challenge the user to return a cryptographic
hash of the user’s secret combined with a server-selected
nonce. However, it is unclear if a scheme within the means
of human memory and calculating ability is achievable. We
examine the commercial offering GrIDsure (a variant of
which is described in a paper [30] by other authors) as
representative of the class.
At registration the user is presented with a grid (e.g., 5×5)
and selects a pattern, or sequence of cells. There are 254
possible length-4 patterns, for example. At login the user
is again presented with the grid, but now populated with
digits. To authenticate he transcribes the digits in the cells
corresponding to his pattern. Since the association of digits
to cells is randomized the string typed by the user is different
from login to login. Thus he reveals knowledge of his secret
without typing the secret itself.
This scheme is similar to passwords in terms of usability
and we (perhaps generously) rate it identically in terms of
many usability benefits. An exception is that it’s only Quasi-
Efficient-to-Use: unlike passwords, which can often be typed
from muscle memory, transcribing digits from the grid cells
requires effort and attention and is likely to be slower.
We consider the scheme as not Accessible as the two-
dimensional layout seems unusable for blind users. The
scheme has Negligible-Cost-per-User, in terms of technol-
ogy. It is not Server-Compatible but is Browser-Compatible.
It is not Mature. We rate it not Non-Proprietary, as the
intellectual property status is unknown.
The security properties are, again, similar to passwords in
many respects. It is not Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, as
a camera that captures both the grid and user input quickly
learns the secret. It is an improvement on passwords in
that it is Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation: we assume
that an attacker is more likely to guess secret strings than
secret patterns based on knowledge of the user. However,
its small space of choices prevents it from being Resilient-
to-Throttled-Guessing or Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing.
In spite of the one-time nature of what the user types the
scheme is not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation: too many
possible patterns are eliminated at each login for the secret
to withstand more than three or four observations. It shares
the remaining security benefits with passwords.
F. Paper tokens: OTPW
Using paper to store long secrets is the cheapest form of
a physical login token. The concept is related to military
codebooks used throughout history, but interest in using
possession of paper tokens to authenticate humans was
spurred in the early 1980’s by Lamport’s hash-chaining
scheme [31], later developed into S/KEY [32]. OTPW is a
later refinement, developed by Kuhn in 1998 [33], in which
the server stores a larger set of independent hash values,
consisting of about 4 kB per user. The user carries the hash
pre-images, printed as 8-character values like IZdB bqyH.
Logging in requires typing a “prefix password” as well as
one randomly-queried hash-preimage.
OTPW rates poorly for usability: the prefix password
means the scheme isn’t Memorywise-Effortless or Scalable-
for-Users; it also isn’t Nothing-to-Carry because of the
paper token. The typing of random passwords means the
scheme also isn’t Physically-Effortless, Efficient-to-Use or
Infrequent-Errors. We do expect that the scheme is Easy-
to-Learn, as typing in a numbered password upon request
is only marginally more difficult than using text passwords.
It is also Easy-Recovery-from-Loss as we expect most users
can easily print a new sheet if needed.
Paper-based tokens are cheap and easy to deploy. We
rate OTPW as non-Accessible because plain printing may be
insufficient for visually-impaired users, though alternatives
(e.g. braille) may be available. We consider the price of
printing to be Negligible-Cost-per-User. While not Server-
Compatible, the scheme is Browser-Compatible. Finally,
OTPW has a mature open-source implementation, making
it Mature and Non-Proprietary.
Though OTPW is designed to resist human observa-
tion compared to S/KEY, it isn’t Resilient-to-Physical-
Observation because the printed sheet of one-time codes
can be completely captured by a camera. Otherwise,
OTPW achieves all other security benefits. Because lo-
gin codes are used only once and randomly generated,
the scheme is Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing, Resilient-to-
Unthrottled-Guessing and Resilient-to-Internal-Observation.
It is Resilient-to-Phishing as it is impractical for a user
to enter all of their secrets into a phishing website even
if asked, and Resilient-to-Theft thanks to the prefix pass-
word. As a one-to-one scheme with different secrets for
each server, it is Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, No-
Trusted-Third-Party and Unlinkable. Finally, the typing re-
quired makes it Requiring-Explicit-Consent.
G. Hardware tokens: RSA SecurID
Hardware tokens store secrets in a dedicated tamper-
resistant module carried by the user; the RSA SecurID [34]
family of tokens is the long-established market leader. Here
we refer to the simplest dedicated-hardware version, which
has only a display and no buttons or I/O ports. Each instance
of the device holds a secret “seed” known to the back-end.
A cryptographically strong transform generates a new 6-
digit code from this secret every 60 seconds. The current
code is shown on the device’s display. On enrollment, the
user connects to the administrative back-end through a web
interface, where he selects a PIN and where the pairing
between username and token is confirmed. From then on,
for authenticating, instead of username and password the
user shall type username and “passcode” (concatenation of a
static 4-digit PIN and the dynamic 6-digit code). RSA offers
an SSO facility to grant access to several corporate resources
with the same token; but we rate this scheme assuming there
won’t be a single SSO spanning all verifiers.
In March 2011 attackers compromised RSA’s back-end
database of seeds [35], which allowed them to predict the
codes issued by any token. This reduced the security of each
account to that of its PIN until the corresponding token was
recalled and reissued.
The scheme is not Memorywise-Effortless nor Scalable-
for-Users (it needs a new token and PIN per verifier). It’s
not Physically-Effortless, because the user must transcribe
the passcode. It’s simple enough to be Easy-to-Learn, but
Quasi-Efficient-to-Use because of the transcription. We rate
it as having Quasi-Infrequent-Errors, like passwords, though
it might be slightly worse. It is not Easy-Recovery-from-
Loss: the token must be revoked and a new one reissued.
The scheme is not Accessible: blind users cannot read
the code off the token. No token-based scheme can of-
fer Negligible-Cost-per-User. The scheme is not Server-
Compatible (a new back-end is required) but it is Browser-
Compatible. It is definitely Mature, but not Non-Proprietary.
As for security, because the code changes every minute,
SecurID is Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, Resilient-
to-Targeted-Impersonation, Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing
and Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing (unless we also as-
sume that the attacker broke into the server and stole the
seeds). It is Resilient-to-Internal-Observation: we assume
that dedicated devices can resist malware infiltration. It’s
Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, as different verifiers
would have their own seeds; Resilient-to-Phishing, because
captured passcodes expire after one minute; and Resilient-to-
Theft, because the PIN is checked at the verifier, so guesses
could be rate-limited. It’s not No-Trusted-Third-Party, as
demonstrated by the March 2011 attack, since RSA keeps
the seed of each token. It’s Requiring-Explicit-Consent, as
the user must transcribe the passcode, and Unlinkable if each
verifier requires its own token.
H. Mobile-Phone-based: Phoolproof
Phoolproof Phishing Prevention [36] is another token-
based design, but one in which the token is a mobile
phone with special code and crypto keys. It uses public key
cryptography and an SSL-like authentication protocol and
was designed to be as compatible as possible with existing
systems.
Phoolproof was conceived as a system to secure banking
transactions against phishing, not as a password replacement.
The user selects a desired site from the whitelist on the
phone; the phone talks wirelessly to the browser, causing
the site to be visited; an end-to-end TLS-based mutual
authentication ensues between the phone and the bank’s
site; the user must still type the banking website password
into the browser. Thus the scheme is not Memorywise-
Effortless, nor Scalable-for-Users. It has Quasi-Nothing-to-
Carry (the mobile phone). It’s not Physically-Effortless as
one must type a password. We rate it Easy-to-Learn, perhaps
generously, and Quasi-Efficient-to-Use as it requires both
typing a password and fiddling with a phone. It’s no better
than passwords on Quasi-Infrequent-Errors, since it still uses
one. The only recovery mechanism is revocation and reissue,
so it doesn’t have Easy-Recovery-from-Loss.
On deployability: it’s Quasi-Accessible insofar as most
disabled users, including blind people, can use a mobile
phone too (note the user doesn’t need to transcribe codes
from the phone). We assume most users will already have a
phone, though perhaps not one of the right type (with Java,
Bluetooth etc), hence it has Quasi-Negligible-Cost-per-User.
The scheme requires changes, albeit minor, to both ends,
so it’s Quasi-Server-Compatible but, by our definitions, not
Browser-Compatible because it uses a browser plugin. It’s
not really Mature (only a research prototype), but it is Non-
Proprietary.
On security: it’s Resilient-to-Physical-Observation,
Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation, Resilient-to-Throttled-
Guessing, Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing because, even
after observing or guessing the correct password, the
attacker can’t authenticate unless he also steals the user’s
phone, which holds the cryptographic keys. It’s Quasi-
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation because malware must
compromise both the phone (to capture the private keys)
and the computer (to keylog the password). It’s Resilient-to-
Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers because the phone has a key pair
per verifier, so credentials are not recycled. It’s definitely
Resilient-to-Phishing, the main design requirement of the
scheme. It’s Resilient-to-Theft because possession of the
phone is insufficient: the user still needs to type user ID and
password in the browser (for additional protection against
theft, the authors envisage an additional PIN or biometric
to authenticate the user to the device; we are not rating
this). The scheme is No-Trusted-Third-Party if we disregard
the CA that certifies the TLS certificate of the bank. It’s
Requiring-Explicit-Consent because the user must type user
ID and password. Finally it’s Unlinkable because the phone
has a different key pair for each verifier.
I. Biometrics: Fingerprint recognition
Biometrics [37] are the “what you are” means of authen-
tication, leveraging the uniqueness of physical or behavioral
characteristics across individuals. We discuss in detail fin-
gerprint biometrics [38]; our summary table also rates iris
recognition [39] and voiceprint biometrics [40]. In rating
for our remote authentication application, and biometric
verification (“Is this individual asserted to be Jane Doe really
Jane Doe?”), we assume unsupervised biometric hardware
as might be built into client devices, vs. verifier-provided
hardware, e.g., at an airport supervised by officials.
Fingerprint biometrics offer usability advantages
Memorywise-Effortless, Scalable-for-Users, Easy-to-Learn,
and Nothing-to-Carry (no secrets need be carried; we
charge elsewhere for client-side fingerprint readers not
being currently universal). Current products are at best
Quasi-Physically-Effortless and Quasi-Efficient-to-Use due
to user experience of not Infrequent-Errors (the latter two
worse than web passwords) and fail to offer Easy-Recovery-
from-Loss (here equated with requiring an alternate scheme
in case of compromise, or users becoming unable to provide
the biometric for physical reasons).
Deployability is poor—we rate it at best Quasi-Accessible
due to common failure-to-register biometric issues; not
Negligible-Cost-per-User (fingerprint reader has a cost);
neither Server-Compatible nor Browser-Compatible, needing
both client and server changes; at best Quasi-Mature for un-
supervised remote authentication; and not Non-Proprietary,
typically involving proprietary hardware and/or software.
We rate the fingerprint biometric Resilient-to-Physical-
Observation but serious concerns include easily fooling
COTS devices, e.g., by lifting fingerprints from glass
surfaces with gelatin-like substances [41], which we
charge by rating not Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation.
It is Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing, but not Resilient-to-
Unthrottled-Guessing for typical precisions used; estimated
“effective equivalent key spaces” [9, page 2032] for fin-
gerprint, iris and voice are 13.3 bits, 19.9 bits and 11.7
bits respectively. It is not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
(captured samples of static physical biometrics are subject
to replay in unsupervised environments), not Resilient-to-
Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, not Resilient-to-Phishing (a seri-
ous concern as biometrics are by design supposed to be hard
to change), and not Resilient-to-Theft (see above re: targeted
impersonation). As a plus, it needs No-Trusted-Third-Party
and is Requiring-Explicit-Consent. Physical biometrics are
also a canonical example of schemes that are not Unlinkable.
V. DISCUSSION
A clear result of our exercise is that no scheme we
examined is perfect—or even comes close to perfect scores.
The incumbent (traditional passwords) achieves all benefits
on deployability, and one scheme (the CAP reader, discussed
in the tech report [1]) achieves all in security, but no
scheme achieves all usability benefits. Not a single scheme
is dominant over passwords, i.e., does better on one or more
benefits and does at least as well on all others. Almost all
schemes do better than passwords in some criteria, but all
are worse in others: as Table I shows, no row is free of red
(horizontal) stripes.
Thus, the current state of the world is a Pareto equilibrium.
Replacing passwords with any of the schemes examined
is not a question of giving up an inferior technology for
something unarguably better, but of giving up one set of
compromises and trade-offs in exchange for another. For
example, arguing that a hardware token like RSA SecurID
is better than passwords implicitly assumes that the security
criteria where it does better outweigh the usability and
deployability criteria where it does worse. For accounts
that require high assurance, security benefits may indeed
outweigh the fact that the scheme doesn’t offer Nothing-
to-Carry nor Negligible-Cost-per-User, but this argument is
less compelling for lower value accounts.
The usability benefits where passwords excel—namely,
Nothing-to-Carry, Efficient-to-Use, Easy-Recovery-from-
Loss—are where essentially all of the stronger security
schemes need improvement. None of the paper token or
hardware token schemes achieves even two of these three.
In expressing frustration with the continuing dominance of
passwords, many security experts presumably view these
two classes of schemes to be sufficiently usable to justify a
switch from passwords. The web sites that crave user traffic
apparently disagree.
Some sets of benefits appear almost incompatible, e.g.,
the pair (Memorywise-Effortless, Nothing-to-Carry) is
achieved only by biometric schemes. No schemes studied
achieve (Memorywise-Effortless, Resilient-to-Theft) fully,
nor (Server-Compatible, Resilient-to-Internal-Observation)
or (Server-Compatible, Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-
Verifiers), though several almost do. Note that since
compatibility with existing servers almost assures a static
replayable secret, to avoid its security implications, many
proposals abandon being Server-Compatible.
A. Rating categories of schemes
Password managers offer advantages over legacy pass-
words in selected usability and security aspects without
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(Incumbent) Web passwords III [13]
Password managers Firefox IV-A [22]LastPass [42]
Proxy URRSA IV-B [5]Impostor [23]
Federated
OpenID IV-C [27]
Microsoft Passport [43]
Facebook Connect [44]
BrowserID [45]
OTP over email [46]
Graphical PCCP IV-D [7]PassGo [47]
Cognitive
GrIDsure (original) IV-E [30]
Weinshall [48]
Hopper Blum [49]
Word Association [50]
Paper tokens
OTPW IV-F [33]
S/KEY [32]
PIN+TAN [51]
Visual crypto PassWindow [52]
Hardware tokens
RSA SecurID IV-G [34]
YubiKey [53]
IronKey [54]
CAP reader [55]
Pico [8]
Phone-based
Phoolproof IV-H [36]
Cronto [56]
MP-Auth [6]
OTP over SMS
Google 2-Step [57]
Biometric
Fingerprint IV-I [38]
Iris [39]
Voice [40]
Recovery
Personal knowledge [58]
Preference-based [59]
Social re-auth. [60]
= offers the benefit; = almost offers the benefit; no circle = does not offer the benefit.
= better than passwords; = worse than passwords; no background pattern = no change.
We group related schemes into categories. For space reasons, in the present paper we describe at most one representative
scheme per category; the companion technical report [1] discusses all schemes listed.
Table I
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS SCHEMES WE EXAMINED
losing much. They could become a staple of users’ coping
strategies if passwords remain widespread, enabling as a ma-
jor advantage the management of an ever-increasing number
of accounts (Scalable-for-Users). However, the underlying
technology remains replayable, static (mainly user-chosen)
passwords.
Federated schemes are particularly hard to grade. Propo-
nents note that security is good if authentication to the iden-
tity provider (IP) is done with a strong scheme (e.g., one-
time passwords or tokens). However in this case usability is
inherited from that scheme and is generally poor, per Table
I. This also reduces federated schemes to be a placeholder
for a solution rather than a solution itself. If authentication
to the IP relies on passwords, then the resulting security is
only a little better than that of passwords themselves (with
fewer password entry instances exposed to attack).
Graphical passwords can approach text passwords on us-
ability criteria, offering some security gain, but static secrets
are replayable and not Resilient-to-Internal-Observation.
Despite adoption for device access-control on some touch-
screen mobile devices, for remote web authentication the
advantages appear insufficient to generally displace a firmly-
entrenched incumbent.
Cognitive schemes show slender improvement on the
security of passwords, in return for worse usability. While
several schemes attempt to achieve Resilient-to-Internal-
Observation, to date none succeed: the secret may withstand
one observation or two [61], but seldom more than a
handful [62]. The apparently inherent limitations [63], [64]
of cognitive schemes to date lead one to question if the
category can rise above one of purely academic interest.
The hardware token, paper token and phone-based cate-
gories of schemes fare very well in security, e.g., most in
Table I are Resilient-to-Internal-Observation, easily beating
other classes. However, that S/KEY and SecurID have been
around for decades and have failed to slow down the
inexorable rise of passwords suggests that their drawbacks
in usability (e.g., not Scalable-for-Users, nor Nothing-to-
Carry, nor Efficient-to-Use) and deployability (e.g., hard-
ware tokens are not Negligible-Cost-per-User) should not be
over-looked. Less usable schemes can always be mandated,
but this is more common in situations where a site has a
de facto monopoly (e.g., employee accounts or government
sites) than where user acceptance matters. Experience shows
that the large web-sites that compete for both traffic and
users are reluctant to risk bad usability [16]. Schemes that
are less usable than passwords face an uphill battle in such
environments.
Biometric schemes have mixed scores on our usability
metrics, and do poorly in deployability and security. As
a major issue, physical biometrics being inherently non-
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation is seriously compounded
by biometrics missing Easy-Recovery-from-Loss as well,
with re-issuance impossible [9]. Thus, e.g., if malware cap-
tures the digital representation of a user’s iris, possible replay
makes the biometric no longer suitable in unsupervised
environments. Hence despite security features appropriate
to control access to physical locations under the supervision
of suitable personnel, biometrics aren’t well suited for un-
supervised web authentication where client devices lack a
trusted input path and means to verify that samples are live.
B. Extending the benefits list
Our list of benefits is not complete, and indeed, any such
list could always be expanded. We did not include resistance
to active-man-in-the-middle, which a few examined schemes
may provide, or to relay attacks, which probably none of
them do. However, tracking all security goals, whether met
or not, is important and considering benefits that indicate
resistance to these (and additional) attacks is worthwhile.
Continuous authentication (with ongoing assurances
rather than just at session start, thereby addressing session
hijacking) is a benefit worth considering, although a goal of
few current schemes. Positive user affectation (how pleasant
users perceive use of a scheme to be) is a standard usability
metric we omitted; unfortunately, the literature currently
lacks this information for most schemes. The burden on
the end-user in migrating from passwords (distinct from
the deployability costs of modifying browser and server
infrastructure) is another important cost—both the one-time
initial setup and per-account transition costs. While ease
of resetting and revoking credentials falls within Easy-
Recovery-from-Loss, the benefit does not include user and
system aspects related to ease of renewing credentials that
expire within normal operations (excluding loss). Other
missing cost-related benefits are low cost for initial setup
(including infrastructure changes by all stakeholders); low
cost for ongoing administration, support and maintenance;
and low overall complexity (how many inter-related “moving
parts" a system has). We don’t capture continued availabil-
ity under denial-of-service attack, ease of use on mobile
devices, nor the broad category of economic and business
effects—e.g., the lack of incentive to be a relying party is
cited as a main reason for OpenID’s lack of adoption [28].
We have not attempted to capture these and other benefits
in the present paper, though all fit into the framework and
could be chosen by others using this methodology. Alas,
many of these raise a difficulty: assigning ratings might be
even more subjective than for existing benefits.
C. Additional nuanced ratings
We considered, but did not use, a “fatal” rating to indicate
that a scheme’s performance on a benefit is so poor that the
scheme should be eliminated from serious consideration. For
example, the 2–3 minutes required for authentication using
the Weinshall or Hopper-Blum schemes may make them
“fatally-non-Efficient-to-Use”, likely preventing widespread
adoption even if virtually all other benefits were provided.
We decided against this because for many properties, it isn’t
clear what level of failure to declare as fatal.
We also considered a “power” rating to indicate that
a scheme optionally enables a benefit for power users—
e.g., OpenID could be rated “amenable-to-No-Trusted-Third-
Party” as users can run their own identity servers, in contrast
to Facebook Connect or Microsoft Passport. The popularity
of webmail-based password reset indicates most users ac-
cede to a heavily-trusted third party for their online identities
already, so “amenable-to” may suffice for adoption. OpenID
is arguably amenable to every security benefit for power
users, but doesn’t provide them for common users who
use text passwords to authenticate to their identity provider.
However, as one could argue for an amenable-to rating for
many properties of many schemes, we maintained focus on
properties provided by default to all users.
D. Weights and finer-grained scoring
We reiterate a caution sounded at the end of Section II: the
benefits chosen as metrics are not all of equal weight. The
importance of any particular benefit depends on target use
and threat environment. While one could assign weights to
each column to compute numerical scores for each scheme,
providing exact weights is problematic and no fixed values
would suit all scenarios; nonetheless, our framework allows
such an endeavour. For finer-grained evaluation, table cell
scores like partially could also be allowed beyond our very
coarse {no, almost, yes} quantization, to further delineate
similar schemes. This has merit but brings the danger of
being “precisely wrong”, and too fine a granularity adds to
the difficulty of scoring schemes consistently. There will be
the temptation to be unrealistically precise (“If scheme X
gets 0.9 for this benefit, then scheme Y should get at most
0.6”), but this demands the ability to maintain a constant
level of precision repeatably across all cells.
We have resisted the temptation to produce an aggregate
score for each scheme (e.g., by counting the number of
benefits achieved), or to rank the schemes. As discussed
above, fatal failure of a single benefit or combined failure
of a pair of benefits (e.g., not being Resilient-to-Internal-
Observation and fatally failing Easy-Recovery-from-Loss for
biometrics) may eliminate a scheme from consideration.
Thus, seeking schemes purely based on high numbers of
benefits could well prove but a distraction.
Beyond divergences of judgement, there will no doubt be
errors in judgement in scoring. The table scoring methodol-
ogy must include redundancy and cross-checks sufficient to
catch most such errors. (Our exercise involved one author
initially scoring a scheme row, co-authors verifying the
scores, and independently, cross-checks within columns to
calibrate individual benefit ratings across schemes; useful
clarifications of benefit definitions often resulted.) Another
danger in being “too precise” arises from scoring on second-
hand data inferred from papers. Coarsely-quantized but self-
consistent scores are likely better than inconsistent ones.
On one hand, it could be argued that different appli-
cation domains (e.g., banking vs. gaming) have different
requirements and that therefore they ought to assign different
weights to the benefits, resulting in a different choice of
optimal scheme for each domain. However on the other
hand, to users, a proliferation of schemes is in itself a
failure: the meta-scheme of “use the best scheme for each
application” will score rather poorly on Scalable-for-Users,
Easy-to-Learn and perhaps a few other usability benefits.
E. Combining schemes
Pairs of schemes that complement each other well in a
two-factor arrangement might be those where both achieve
good scores in usability and deployability and at least one
does so in security—so a combined scheme might be viewed
as having the AND of the usability-deployability scores
(i.e., the combination does not have a particular usability
or deployability benefit unless both of the schemes do) and
the OR of the security scores (i.e., the combination has the
security benefit if either of the schemes do). An exception
would appear to be the usability benefit Scalable-for-Users
which a combination might inherit from either component.
However, this is necessarily just a starting point for the
analysis: it is optimistic to assume that two-component
schemes always inherit benefits in this way. Wimberly and
Liebrock [65] observed that the presence of a second factor
caused users to pick much weaker passwords than if pass-
words alone were used to protect an account—as predicted
by Adams’s “risk thermostat” model [66]. Thus, especially
where user choice is involved, there can be an erosion of the
efficacy of one protection when a second factor is known to
be in place. Equally, defeating one security mechanism may
also make it materially easier to defeat another. We rated,
e.g., Phoolproof Quasi-Resilient-to-Internal-Observation be-
cause it requires an attacker to compromise both a PC and a
mobile device. However, malware has already been observed
in the wild which leverages a compromised PC to download
further malware onto mobile devices plugged into the PC
for a software update [67].
See O’Gorman [9] for suggested two-factor combinations
of biometrics, passwords, and tokens, for various applica-
tions (e.g., combining a hardware token with a biometric).
Another common suggestion is pairing a federated scheme
with a higher-security scheme, e.g., a hardware token.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The concise overview offered by Table I allows us to see
high level patterns that might otherwise be missed. We could
at this stage draw a variety of conclusions and note, for
example, that graphical and cognitive schemes offer only
minor improvements over passwords and thus have little
hope of displacing them. Or we could note that most of
the schemes with substantial improvements in both usability
and security can be seen as incarnations of Single-Sign-
On (including in this broad definition not only federated
schemes but also “local SSO” systems [26] such as password
managers or Pico). Having said that, we expect the long-
term scientific value of our contribution will lie not as much
in the raw data distilled herein, as in the methodology by
which it was assembled. A carefully crafted benefits list
and coherent methodology for scoring table entries, despite
inevitable (albeit instructive) disagreements over fine points
of specific scores, allows principled discussions about high
level conclusions.
That a Table I scheme (the CAP reader) scored full marks
in security does not at all suggest that its real-world security
is perfect—indeed, major issues have been found [55]. This
is a loud warning that it would be unwise to read absolute
verdicts into these scores. Our ratings are useful and we
stand by them, but they are not a substitute for independent
critical analysis or for considering aspects we didn’t rate,
such as vulnerability to active man-in-the-middle attacks.
We note that the ratings implied by scheme authors in
original publications are often not only optimistic, but also
incomplete. Proponents, perhaps subconsciously, often have
a biased and narrow view of what benefits are relevant. Our
framework allows a more objective assessment.
In closing we observe that, looking at the green (vertical)
and red (horizontal) patterns in Table I, most schemes
do better than passwords on security—as expected, given
that inventors of alternatives to passwords tend to come
from the security community. Some schemes do better and
some worse on usability—suggesting that the community
needs to work harder there. But every scheme does worse
than passwords on deployability. This was to be expected
given that the first four deployability benefits are defined
with explicit reference to what passwords achieve and the
remaining two are natural benefits of a long-term incum-
bent, but this uneven playing field reflects the reality of a
decentralized system like the Internet. Marginal gains are
often not sufficient to reach the activation energy necessary
to overcome significant transition costs, which may provide
the best explanation of why we are likely to live considerably
longer before seeing the funeral procession for passwords
arrive at the cemetery.
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